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When do regulations matter for bank risk-taking? An analysis of the 
interaction between external regulation and board characteristics 
 
Abstract 
Purpose - According to previous international studies the impact of external regulation on 
bank risk is ambiguous. This paper asks the question, “When do regulations matter for bank 
risk-taking?” by reporting the first empirical investigation of how the relation between bank 
regulations (capital requirements, official supervisory power, and market discipline) and bank 
risk-taking is moderated by board monitoring characteristics. 
Design/methodology/approach - Using SYS-GMM, the analysis of the interaction between 
bank-level boards of directors’ attributes (board size, board independence, and board gender 
diversity) and external regulation is based on a sample of 493 banks operating in 54 countries 
over 2001-2015, accounting for three measures of bank risk-taking. 
Findings - Regulations matter for bank risk-taking conditional on board characteristics: 
board size, board independence and board diversity. With the exception of capital 
requirements, the market discipline exerted by external private monitoring and greater 
supervisory power are unable to mitigate the propensity to greater risk taking by banks 
resulting from larger board size, higher board indep ndence and greater gender diversity of 
the board. 
Originality/value - The bank risk empirical literature is still silent as to the interaction 
between board governance and regulation for the purpose of examining banks’ risk-taking. 
This paper fills this gap, thus making a significant contribution by extending our knowledge 
of whether and how board governance moderates the relationship betwe n external regulation 
and bank risk-taking. 
Keywords: Corporate governance; Board of directors; Regulation; Banks; Risk taking 
Paper type:  Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
The 2007/2008 global financial crisis highlighted severe problems with excessive risk-taking 
by banks as well as bank regulation and supervision [1], with the weak governance of banks 
frequently pointed to in the literature as the main culprit of the crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009; 
Bruner, 2011; DeYoung et al., 2013). Despite being seemingly compliant with Basel capital 
standards [2] many banks had, in fact, accumulated excessive amounts of leverage, carrying 
risks which inflicted incalculable losses. Further, liquidity risk proved to be a key driver of 
financial contagion during this crisis, with the bank regulation framework revealing itself as 
insufficient to prevent the emergence of the proverbial ‘too-big-to-fail’ financial institutions 
(Fullenkamp and Rochon, 2016). The regulatory response with regard to the governance of 
banks has been substantial, a central feature of the post-crisis financial reform agenda, at both 
the national and international level (see, for example, Walker, 2009; and International 
Monetary Fund, 2014), including innumerable additions and amendments to the Basel 
Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015).  
Against this backcloth, the corporate governance literature has highlighted how the 
agency problems of banks [3] are exacerbated by the existence of government guarantees and 
deposit insurance, which distort bankers’ incentives and encourage risk taking (Haan and 
Vlahu, 2016). This literature has also identified the salient features of the role that both the 
board of directors’ structural characteristics and the external national regulator, can play to 
ensure ‘good governance’ [4]. 
Yet, no prior study has specifically investigated how boards’ internal governance 
characteristics moderate the relation between external bank regulations and individual banks’ 
propensity to risk taking. Knowledge of this moderation (interaction) effect is important since 
it can have important policy implications as different types of regulations may have different 
effects on bank risk-taking depending on the structure and characteristics of bank boards. 
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Hagendorff et al. (2010) is the only banking industry study that has specifically tested the 
interaction between bank board monitoring characteristics and bank regulation. However, 
Hagendorff et al. (2010) do so for the purpose of examining how the interaction between 
bank-level monitoring and regulatory regimes influences the announcement period returns of 
acquiring banks. The bank risk empirical literature is still silent as to the interaction between 
board governance characteristics and external regulation for the purpose of examining the 
resulting attitude to risk taking by banks. This gap makes the motivation for such a study both 
timely and opportune.  
The aim of our study is to fill this important gap and, in so doing, make a significant 
contribution by extending ur knowledge of whether and how board governance (in terms of 
board size, board independence, and board gender diversity) moderates the relation between 
external regulation (capital requirements, official supervisory power, and market discipline) 
and bank risk-taking (here measured by insolvency risk, credit risk and volatility of equity 
returns).  
 
2. A brief literature review 
In addition to its advisory role, as a monitor, the board of directors (board) is meant to 
supervise managers so as to ensure their decisions are in line with the interests of 
shareholders. As such, the board is regarded as the key internal governance structure holding 
responsibility for the implementation of an effective system of risk management (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2016). Theoretically, the smaller and the more 
independent the board is (in terms of board size and representation by directors without close 
connections to management), the more likely that ‘good governance’ will be enforced 
(Mehran et al., 2011; Aebi et al., 2012). Some prior evidence shows board size to have a 
negative relationship with firm performance (see, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Small 
boards are expected to be more effective monitors since they can reduce the cost of directors’ 
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free-rider and coordination problems (Jensen, 1993). Large boards have been found to be less 
agile and cohesive, more susceptible to communication and coordination costs, and to ‘free-
riding’ director problems (see Jensen, 1993; and Pathan, 2009), all of which point to less 
efficient monitoring by large boards. Independent directors in boards are believed to be better 
at exerting their monitoring function as they are less obliged to management and are better at 
representing the interest of shareholders (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). There is also a 
growing debate about gender and its effect on economic outcomes such as risk preferences 
(e.g., Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Previous literature suggests that women are less over-
confident and more risk averse in financial decision making than men (Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2001). Thus, in theory, a ‘good’ board, a small-sized one, 
more independent in nature and with a higher representation of women, is expected to better 
monitor bank risk-taking.  
Nevertheless, studies placing the spotlight on the specific impact of board monitoring 
and board attributes on bank risk-taking (Akhigbe and Martin, 2006; Pathan, 2009; Grove et 
al., 2011; Aebi et al., 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; Berger et al., 2014; 
Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Anginer et al., 2016; Nurlan et al., 2016; Srivastav and 
Hagendorff, 2016; Tsung-Ming, 2017; Mamatzakis et al., 2017), yield, collectively, mixed 
evidence and, with few notable exceptions (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009), tend to ignore the 
role of external bank regulations. This omission is striking since the wider literature on either 
financial or non-financial firms suggests that regulatory policies can play an important role in 
shaping internal governance and the structure and independence of boards (see, for example, 
Kole and Lehn, 1999; Booth et al., 2002; Li and Song, 2013). The literature is at best 
ambiguous as to the impact of regulation on the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
general, and of boards’ monitoring efficacy in particular. If regulation limits managerial 
discretion and restricts its scope to adversely affect shareholder wealth, regulation would act 
as a substitute for board monitoring (as theoretically predicted by Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 
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and empirically proven by Guo et al., 2015). Alternatively, strict regulation may foster 
greater and more effective institution-level governance resulting in a synergistic and self-
reinforcing relationship.  
In addition to board monitoring, banks are intensively externally regulated due to their 
inherent susceptibility to systemic risks. Hence, the external regulator too plays a monitoring 
role, also to ensure the soundness of financial institutions by acting on behalf of small 
depositors who may be unable to monitor banks individually, creating incentives, or 
legislating so as to restrict or regulate the activities of banks, including setting requirements 
on regulatory capital (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Theoretical studies provide two conflicting 
views on the relationship between regulations and bank performance. From a bank 
perspective, less strict regulations and restrictions on banking activities may increase 
opportunities for bank diversification, the risk-shift incentive, thereby reducing risk-taking. 
On the other hand, less strict regulations and restrictions may expand bank’s range of risk 
investment activities, thereby increasing banks’ propensity to risk taking (González, 2005). 
From a regulator perspective, Barth et al. (2006) and Barth et al., (2013b) suggest two 
opposite veiws: the ‘public interest view’ and the ‘private interest view’. The ‘public interest 
view’ suggests that regulation promotes bank efficiency and mitigates market failures as 
government acts in the interest of the public. The ‘private interest view’ suggests that 
regulation impedes bank performance as government acts in the special interest of the few 
rather than the broader public.  
The existing empirical literature investigating the impact of bank regulations on risk 
taking (González, 2005; Barth et al., 2008; Agoraki et al., 2011; Delis and Staikouras, 2011) 
suggests that the influence of bank regulation varies depending on charter value, competition 
and deposit insurance schemes. Significantly, although some studies find that stricter 
regulation is associated with lower bank risk-taking (e.g., Buch and DeLong, 2008; Fonseca 
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and González, 2010; Agoraki et al., 2011; Klomp and De Haan, 2012), other prominent 
studies do not. For example, examining Basel Core Principles for effective banking 
supervision (BCPs), the international study by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) does 
not find regulation to be robustly associated with ‘bank soundness’, expressed in terms of 
both bank risk and systemic risk. Using data for over 3,000 banks from 86 countries, they do 
not find that better regulation and supervision promote sounder banks. 
Nevertheless, by and large, the role of interaction between bank regulation and board 
monitoring on bank risk-taking has been ignored by the above two strands of literature. The 
first study attempting to examine the effects of regulations on bank risk-taking while also 
investigating the impact of corporate governance is that by Laeven and Levine (2009). They 
find that regulation has various effects on bank risk-taking depending on banks’ management 
and ownership structure. Baysinger and Zardkoohi (1986) had already suggested that 
regulators can exert a complementary monitoring and disciplinary function leading to 
outcomes similar to those achieved by board monitoring. Stricter bank regulation, therefore, 
can promote boards to monitor more effectively. On the other hand, it has also been 
suggested that more extensive monitoring of bank management by regulators can reduce the 
incentive for boards to effectively monitor. For example, greater official supervisory power, 
by limiting managerial discretion and providing fewer opportunities for managers to pursue 
personal benefits, reduces shareholders’ incentive to monitor (Li and Song, 2013).  
 Yet, as noted in our introduction, no prior study has specifically investigated how 
boards’ internal governance moderates the relation between bank regulations and individual 
banks’ propensity to risk taking. Hagendorff et al. (2010) is the only banking industry study 
that has specifically tested the interaction between bank board monitoring and bank 
regulation. However, they did so in order to investigate how the interaction between bank-
level monitoring and regulatory regimes influences the announcement period returns of 
Page 6 of 43Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance
 
7 
 
acquiring banks. The bank risk empirical literature is still silent as to the interaction between 
board governance and regulation for the purpose of examining the resulting attitude to risk 
taking by banks, which is the focus of our interest.  
 
3. Empirical methodology and data 
3.1 Method and variables 
Two econometric issues are likely to be encountered when modelling the relationship in 
question. The first such issue relates to the potential endogeneity of board structure variables. 
This concern arises because both boards and bank risk-taking may be concomitantly affected 
by changes in regulatory and macroeconomic conditions. These influences can give rise to 
undesirable endogenous correlations and/or feedback effects among variables, stemming 
from reverse causality or simultaneity biases. Such biases may be further augmented by the 
possible endogeneity inherent in other variables typically entering bank risk equations such as 
bank capitalisation (see, e.g., the discussion in Delis and Kouretas, 2011). The second 
econometric issue concerns the need to account for the underlying dynamics of the 
relationship in question. This need arises because of the well-known persistence of bank risk 
and bank risk-taking. Such persistence stems from on-going competition in the banking 
industry, the long-term nature of some borrowing/lending transactions, and the time required 
for any effects stemming from shocks in macroeconomic fundamentals to smooth over time. 
In the presence of such effects, the resulting persistence of the risk seri s means that a static 
model would inevitably produce biased estimates. This problem calls for a modelling 
approach capable of estimating a dynamic model specification, that is, a specification that 
includes the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor.  
      To satisfactorily address all the econometric issues outlined above, the methodology 
we choose to apply is the system generalised methods-of-moments (SYS-GMM) proposed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998); a well-known extension of the 
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GMM estimation technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Unlike other commonly 
used panel estimation techniques that are unsuitable in application to the empirical analysis 
we aim to carry out, SYS-GMM can be regarded as the ideal method of choice given our 
econometric setting. Indeed, as recently noted by De Vita and Kyaw (2017), the SYS-GMM 
estimator “thanks to its variables instrumentation, first-difference transformation and 
simultaneous combination of moment conditions for both the level and first-difference 
equations, accounts for the underlying dynamics of the data generation process whilst also 
dealing with country-specific effects, measurement error and endogeneity bias.” (ibid, p. 9).    
      This approach has been extensively used in previous governance studies (see, among 
others, Wintoki et al., 2012; Adams and Mehran, 2012; and Liang et al., 2013), as it deals 
with potential endogeneity by using lagged board variables and lagged regulatory variables as 
weak instruments by assuming that board and regulatory variables in earlier years could not 
have resulted from bank performance in subsequent years, which is a plausible. 
Within this methodological approach, our specific econometric model can be 
represented as: 
0 1 , , 1 2 3 4 5 6*ijt i j t ijt jt ijt jt ijt jt t ijtr r BOARD reg BOARD reg b c uδ δ δ δ δ δ δ λ−= + + + + + + + +   
where i represents individual banks, j represents countries, t represents years. The dependent 
variable is individual bank risk-taking, r. Independent variables are: board structure, BOARD; 
a set of bank regulatory variables, reg; a set of bank-level control variables, b; country 
specific variables, c; time effects, λ ; and u is the error term.  In estimation we use 
Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by country and, where 
multicollinearity is found to be present, by bank. 
 
3.2 Measuring bank risk-taking 
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We use three alternative measures of bank risk-taking: insolvency risk (ZSCORE); credit risk 
(NPL); and volatility of equity return (SDVOL). Following Laeven and Levine (2009), Pathan 
(2009), and others, our first measure of bank risk-taking is ZSCORE. ZSCORE has been 
widely used in banking studies and is calculated as: ( / ) /ZSCORE ROA E A ROAσ= + , 
where ROA and E / A are the rate of return on assets and the ratio of equity to assets, 
respectively; ROAσ  is the standard deviation of the rate of return on assets and is calculated 
from present year and the past two years. The value of ZSCORE is inversely related to the 
probability of bank insolvency and thus the higher ZSCORE is, the more stability. Our second 
measure is NPL, as a proxy for credit risk, which is the ratio of nonperforming loans over 
total loans. Finally, following Elyasiani and Zhang (2015), we use volatility of stock returns 
(SDVOL) as a proxy for forward looking risk, a measure based on market rather than 
accounting data, calculated as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. 
 
3.3 Measuring board structure 
Following recently empirical corporate governance studies in the banking industry (see, 
among others, Adams and Mehran, 2012; and Anginer et al., 2016), we consider three board 
structure variables: board size (BSIZE), board independence (BINDEP), and board gender 
diversity (BDIVERS). Board size (BSIZE) is measured by the total number of directors. 
Following Erkens et al. (2012), board independence (BINDEP) is measured by the ratio of 
independent directors who are part of the board. According to BoardEx data, directors are 
defined as “independent” if they are non-executive directors (i.e., not full-time employees). 
We also compare the value of repeat observations of board independence among the different 
databases we draw from to collect such data (BoardEx, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuter 
Eikon) and can confirm they use the same definition. Board gender diversity is measured by 
the number of board members to relativize the percentage of females on the board. 
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 We should clarify that, of course, many individual countries over our sample period 
have introduced codes of corporate governance (CG) mostly in line with international 
standards, suggesting recommendations and reforms ranging from better disclosure of 
information to improved external and internal audits (possibly also impacting board structure 
variables) so as to ensure that companies are more accountable to all shareholders. Yet, by 
already controlling for governance/board structure variables, our data already captures 
whatever influence individual countries’ CG codes have had in driving such variables. 
 
3.4 Measuring bank regulation 
Following previous studies on bank regulation, governance structure, and risk taking (e.g., 
Agoraki et al., 2011; Li and Song, 2013; Luo et al., 2016), three key regulatory variables are 
used: capital requirements (CAPR); official supervisory power (SUPP); and private 
monitoring (PRIM). Bank regulation measures are at the country level. The index of capital 
requirements (CAPR) represents both initial and overall capital stringency. Initial capital 
stringency indicates whether certain funds can be counted as initially capitalising a bank and 
whether they are verified by regulatory or supervisory authorities. Overall capital stringency 
reflects whether the capital requirements consider risk elements and value losses. The capital 
requirements index can take value between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating more 
stringent capital requirements. The index of official supervisory power (SUPP) represents the 
power of the bank supervisors to take certain actions on bank management and ranges 
between 0 and 16 with higher values indicating more powerful supervisors. The index of 
private monitoring (PRIM) reflects the degree of bank supervision such as requirements for 
banks to release comprehensive information to the public and takes a value from 0 to 12, with 
higher values indicating more stringent requirements on information disclosure and private 
monitoring. This is, therefore, a measure of market discipline (MARDIS). More detailed and 
additional information on the three regulatory variables are provided in Appendix A. 
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3.5 Control variables 
We include several bank and country-specific characteristics as control variables. For 
the bank-level characteristics, we include the natural logarithm of total assets, used as a proxy 
for bank size (SIZE), and the ratio of equity of assets as a proxy for bank capitalisation (EOA). 
We also include a ‘foreign-owned’ dummy variable (OWNERSHIP) from the database of 
Claessens and van Horen (2014) where foreign-owned banks are identified as those with 50% 
or more of their shares owned by foreign investors. We add CEO duality (CEODUAL) to our 
specification, a dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and board chair 
are combined and zero if the CEO does not act as the chairman of the board. For the country-
level characteristics, we use ‘a rule of law’ (RULEOFLAW) index and a ‘legal origin’ 
(LEGAL) dummy variable to capture a country’s institutional environment. The rule of law 
index ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) and reflects perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. The legal origin dummy equals to one if a country is in a 
civil-law regime, and zero if country is under a common-law. We also use bank concentration 
(CONC) defined as a ratio of the total assets of the three largest commercial banks to the total 
assets of all commercial banks of a country as a proxy of the financing orientation of the 
country and reliance on banks. Finally, we include the inflation rate (INFA) and the natural 
logarithm of GDP (LNGDP) to control for the country macroeconomic (monetary) 
environment and the stage of economic development.  
 
3.6 Data  
We use three main data sources for boards of directors’ attributes of individual banks: 
Bloomberg, BoardEx and Thomson Reuter Eikon. Bank level accounting data is obtained 
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from FintechConnect and market data is from Thomson Reuter Eikon. The ownership 
variable is from Claessens and Van Horen (2014). We obtain data on country-level 
macroeconomic factors from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database, the 
regulation and supervision variables from Barth et al. (2013a) and the legal and institutional 
environment variables from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and La Porta et al. 
(1999). Unlike most of the previous studies which focus on bank holding companies (e.g., 
Pathan, 2009; Li and Song, 2013; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015), we focus on commercial banks 
only; a choice that ensures a more homogenous sample in terms, for example, of similar 
production technology. Moreover, regulatory data are only applicable to commercial banks 
(Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Luo et al., 2016). 
We constructed our sample by first considering all the commercial banks in the 
Bloomberg, Boardex and Thomson R uter Eikon database, and then excluding: (i) repeating 
bank-year observations among the three databases; (ii) banks for which any of the above 
board measures and regulatory variables were not available; (iii) bank-year observations for 
which at least one of the bank-specific control variables was missing; (iv) banks for which 
other country-specific variables were not available. The (unbalanced) sample includes up to 
493 banks (the exact number varies across estimated regressions, depending on the risk-
taking measure used) in 54 countries over the 2001-2015 period. Given we aim at identifying 
a relation across countries, cross-sectional variation is important if one is to understand the 
differences in regulation. To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive panel data set 
that has been used to study the bank risk-taking/board attributes relationship. Table 1 and 2 
report summary statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables. 
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
4. Empirical results and discussion 
4.1 Main results  
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To test the overall validity of the instruments, we use the Hansen J-test of the over-
identifying restrictions. We also report the AR(2) test for no second-order correlation and the 
Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors (clustered by country, or by bank, depending on 
the presence of multicollinearity). The AR(2) test rejects the presence of second-order 
autocorrelation and the Hansen test indicates that the model is not over-identified in all 
estimations. The statistically significant coefficients of the lagged dependent variable suggest 
that bank risk-taking is highly persistent.  
Table 3 shows the estimation results. In terms of the individual, independent effects of 
the variables included in the model, inflation (INFA) appears to exert a statistically 
insignificant effect on bank risk-taking. This result contrasts with the hypothesised monetary 
transmission mechanism of the risk-taking channel relating to how changes in monetary 
policy rates affect either risk perceptions or risk-tolerance (Borio and Zhu, 2008). With the 
exception of column 2, also GDP (LNGDP) is mostly statistically insignificant.  
Similarly, most of the regulatory, control and board attribute variables such as capital 
requirement (CAPR), board size, BSIZE (with the exc ption of column 1 and 5), board 
independence, BINDPEN (with the exception of column 7, 8 and 9), bank size, SIZE (with 
the exception of column 1 and 9), supervisory power, SUPP (with the exception of column 5), 
market discipline, PRIM (with the exception of column 1), capital (CAPITAL), foreign 
ownership, OWNERSHIP (with the exception of column 1), legal (LEGAL), board 
independence, BINDEP (with the exception of column 7, 8 and 9), CEO duality (CEODUAL), 
board diversity (BDIVERS), rule of law (with the exception of column 2), bank concentration, 
CONC (with the exception of column 2 and 5), do not show any significantly robust impact 
on bank risk-taking. Of these results, the lack of a robustly significant effect of board 
independence is perhaps the most unexpected one, though we should draw attention to the 
fact that board independence is different from well-performing independent directors. For 
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example, see the busy independent director literature, including Fich and Shivdasani (2006). 
This might be the reason why board independence does not show strongly supportive 
evidence from our data [5] with the exception of specifications using a forward looking 
measure of risk (SDVOL).
 
Of interest are also the estimates for board size (BSIZE) reported in 
column 1 and 5, where BSIZE appears to increase bank risk-taking.  
We should now focus on the more telling effects of the interaction terms reported in 
Table 3. Board independence significantly increases bank risk-taking when interacting with 
supervisory power (BINDPEN_SUPP) in column 1 and 7, and private monitoring 
(BINDPEN_PRIM) in column 1, while board size significantly increases bank risk-taking 
when interacting with supervisory power (BSIZE _SUPP) in column 5, and private 
monitoring (BSIZE_PRIM) in column 2, though decreasing bank risk-taking when interacting 
with capital requirements (BSIZE_CAPR) in column 2. Finally, board diversity significantly 
increases bank risk-taking when interacting with supervisory power (BDIVERS_SUPP) in 
column 9, and private monitoring (BDIVERS_PRIM) in column 3.  
Interestingly, though the independent effect of the market discipline through private 
monitoring (PRIM) is negative on bank risk-taking (ZSCORE) in column 1 (the estimated 
coefficient is 0.5461), when interacting with BINDEPEN, BSIZE and BDIVERS (see column 
1, 2 and 3), the effect turns positive on ZSCORE measures of bank risk-taking. The 
interaction term, BINDPEN_SUPP, is also significant in column 1 and 7, again denoting a 
positive effect thereby increasing bank risk-taking. Supervisory power also interacts 
positively with board independence (BINDPEN_SUPP) in column 1 and 7 (-1.4619** and 
0.0111**, respectively), board size (BSIZE _SUPP) in column 5 (0.0146*), and board 
diversity (BDIVERS_SUPP) in column 9 (0.0140**).   
[Tables 4 and 5 here] 
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We wish to interrogate the data further by splitting the sample according to large and 
small boards (Table 4) and according to the degree of independence of the board (Table 5), as 
these are the board attributes that appear to most significantly moderate the relationship 
between external regulation and bank risk-taking. 
As shown in Table 4, BINDPEN increases bank risk-taking under large boards 
(column 3), and so does supervisory power (column 1 and 3). The results for private 
monitoring are more ambiguous and dependent on the risk measure used, showing a positive 
effect on risk taking in column 1 (using ZSCORE) and a negative effect (using SDVOL) in 
column 5. On the other hand, capital requirements (CAPR) are confirmed to decrease risk 
taking, using ZSCORE, under large boards (column 1).  
In Table 5 PRIM is consistently insignificant and CAPR is only significant in column 
6, decreasing bank risk-taking (SDVOL) under boards characterised by low independence. 
BSIZE is found to increase bank risk-taking (NPL) under low independence of boards 
(column 4).  
Taken collectively, our evidence suggests that larger and more independent boards 
tend to increase bank risk-taking and that such effect is reinforced when they interact with 
supervisory power and private monitoring. On the other hand, capital requirements deter risk 
taking by banks.     
 
4.2 Further analysis and robustness tests 
We conduct two robustness checks to investigate whether the results reported in Table 
3 might be driven by sample distribution, as only less than half of the countries in our sample 
have five or more banks, and US banks in our panel constitute a large proportion of the 
sample (see appendix B). We, therefore, exclude countries with less than 5 banks (Table 6) 
and US banks (Table 7), and re-estimate the regressions underlying the results presented in 
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Table 3. For Table 6 and 7, we use time and country OLS fixed effects regressions. Our 
model includes almost 15 explanatory variables and SYS-GMM generates so many lag 
instrumental variables leading to multicollinearity between current and lagged variables 
especially within the smaller sample size of such regressions. This empirical strategy also 
allow us to check the sensitivity of our results across estimation methods.  
 The new estimations for the two sub-samples yield consistent results for the effect of 
BSIZE and BINDEPEN, both of which are found to be statistically significant in most 
specifications and across risk taking measures in Table 6 and 7, consistently in the direction 
of increases in bank risk-taking. Interestingly, the independent effect of PRIM on risk taking 
is negative in both Table 6 (column 4, 5, 6, and 9) and Table 7 (column 1, 2, and 3). Most 
importantly given our purposes, all the statistically significant interaction terms 
(BINDEPEN_SUPP; BINDEPEN_PRIM; BSIZE_SUPP; BSIZE_PRIM; BDIVERS_SUPP; 
BDIVERS_PRIM) are also in the direction of higher bank risk-taking, suggesting that the 
strength of board characteristics overrides any constraining influence on bank risk-taking 
stemming from external regulation (supervisory power and private monitoring), with the 
exception of higher capital requirements.  
 [Tables 6 and 7 here] 
 Of particular significance across the results reported in Table 6 and 7, is the strongly 
significant effect of bank size (SIZE) across most specifications, always in the direction of an 
increase in bank risk-taking. We suggest that this pattern in the data may be because large 
boards are more likely to belong to big banks expected to be ‘too big to fail’; a perception of 
‘invincibility’ as it were, which may lead the larger boards of big banks to a greater 
propensity to risk taking. On average, inflation (INFA) tends to reduce bank risk-taking, and 
so do GDP (LNGDP), foreign ownership (OWNERSHIP), legal requirements (LEGAL), and 
rule of law (RULEOFLAW). 
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5. Conclusion 
The innovative element underlying our study lies in testing empirically how bank board’s 
monitoring characteristics moderate the relationship between external banking regulations 
and risk taking by banks, an analysis that is absent in prior literature. Using data for 493 
banks in 54 countries over the period 2001-2015, we find that with the exception of capital 
requirements, the market discipline exerted by external private monitoring and greater 
supervisory power are unable to mitigate the propensity to greater risk taking by banks 
resulting from larger board size, higher board independence and greater gender diversity of 
the board. Significant interaction effects in the direction of greater bank risk-taking between 
such board characteristics and external regulation show that the significantly positive effect 
of board characteristics on bank risk-taking clearly overrides any mitigating effects of 
supervisor power and private monitoring.  
Our results make a significant contribution to the current policy debate on improving 
the regulatory framework in the banking sector after the 2007/2008 financial crisis. The 
findings suggest that ignoring individual banks’ board attributes, particularly board size and 
board independence, may lead to erroneous conclusions about the impact of regulation on 
bank risk-taking. The main implication is that external regulation should focus on stricter 
capital requirements to be most effective, and monitor more closely big banks with a large, 
more independent and gender diverse board in an attempt to control their greater propensity 
to risk taking. Such findings and associated implications should be of particular value to 
policy makers charged with the design of more effective bank regulation capable of taking 
into account micro-level internal governance responses. 
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Notes 
1. For a clear discussion of the definition of supervision as a distinct component of bank 
regulation, we refer interested readers to Litan and Hawke (2012).  
2. Basel capital standards relate to the Basel Core Principles (BCPs) which embody the best 
practices in supervision and regulation. These principles were issued in 1997 by the Basel 
Committee on Bank Supervision, comprising representatives from bank supervisory agencies 
of advanced countries. 
3. The agency problem in banks stems from the fact that depositors, being fully protected, 
have weak incentives to monitor shareholders and constrain them from increasing risk taking 
(e.g., Demsetz et al., 1997). 
4.  ‘Good governance’ is a term that has become a part of the vernacular but despite being 
widely used and debated in the literature, it still lacks conceptual clarity. In general, the 
concept embraces aspects related to transparency, accountability and ethical leadership within 
economic institutions and public sector management. Despite this consensus, ‘good 
governance’ remains an extremely elusive objective as there is no single approach to it. In the 
banking sector, the Basel Committee's revised principles on corporate governance at banks 
provide a framework for effective corporate governance, which is seen as critical to the 
proper functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole. We take this 
framework as the most suitable operationalisation of the term 'good governance' within the 
banking sector. The Committee's revised principles aim to provide a framework “within 
which banks and supervisors should operate to achieve robust and transparent risk 
management and decision-making and, in doing so, promote public confidence and uphold 
the safety and soundness of the banking system.” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2015). 
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5. It is also important to note that a board operates by voting. Accordingly, we also consider 
using an indicator variable (of majority) instead of a continuous variable in measuring the 
presence of independent directors. Following Anginer et al. (2016), we calculate an indicator 
variable for board independence ranging from 1 to 6, with a higher value indicating a more 
independent board. Specifically, the variable equals ‘1’ if a board is controlled by insiders, ‘2’ 
if a board is controlled by a majority of insiders and affiliated outsiders, ‘3’ if the fraction of 
independent board members lies between 50% and 67%, ‘4’ if the fraction lies between 67% 
and 75%, ‘5’ if the fraction lies between 75% and 90%, and ‘6’ if the fraction is greater than 
90% or the board has no more than one officer and no affiliated outsiders. The results are 
consistent. 
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Appendix A 
 
Variables Description Source 
Board size (BSIZE) The number of directors in the board. Bloomberg; BoardEx; 
Thomson Reuter Eikon 
Board independence 
(BINDEP) 
The percentage of total directors who are 
independent. 
Bloomberg; BoardEx; 
Thomson Reuter Eikon 
Board diversity 
(BDIVERS) 
The percentage of total directors who are 
women. 
Bloomberg; BoardEx; 
Thomson Reuter Eikon 
Capital requirements 
(CAPR) 
Index of capital requirements, composed on the 
basis of answers to following questions: (1) Is 
the capital-asset ratio risk weighted in line with 
the Basel I guidelines? (2) Does the minimum 
capital-asset ratio vary as a function of an 
individual bank’s credit risk? (3) Does the 
minimum capital-asset ratio vary as a function 
of market risk? (4) Before minimum capital 
adequacy is determined, which of the following 
are deducted from the book value of capital? 
Market value of loan losses not realized in 
accounting books? Unrealized losses in 
securities portfolios? Or unrealized foreign 
exchange losses? (5) What fraction of 
revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? 
(6) Are the sources of funds to be used as 
capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory 
authorities? (7) Can the initial disbursement or 
subsequent injections of capital be done with 
assets other than cash or government securities? 
(8) Can initial disbursement of capital be done 
with borrowed funds? On a scale of 0–10, larger 
values of this index indicate more stringent 
capital regulation. 
Barth et al. (2013a) 
Supervisory power 
(SUPP) 
Index of official supervisory power, determined 
by adding 1 if answer is yes or 
0 otherwise to each of these questions: (1) Does 
the supervisory agency have the right to meet 
with external auditors about banks? (2) Are 
auditors required to communicate directly to the 
supervisory agency about elicit activities, fraud, 
or insider abuse? (3) Can supervisors take legal 
action against external auditors for negligence? 
(4) Can the supervisory authority force a bank 
to change its internal organizational structure? 
(5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to 
supervisors? (6) Can the supervisory agency 
order the bank’s directors or management to 
constitute provisions to cover actual or potential 
losses? (7) Can the supervisory agency suspend 
the directors’ decision to distribute (a) 
dividends, (b) bonuses, and (c) management 
fees? (8) Can the supervisory agency supersede 
the rights of bank shareholders and declare a 
bank insolvent? (9) Can the supervisory agency 
suspend some or all ownership rights? (10) Can 
the supervisory agency (a) supersede 
Barth et al. (2013a) 
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shareholder rights, (b) remove and replace 
management, and (c) remove and replace 
director? The range of this index 0–16, with 
larger values indicating greater supervisory 
power. 
Private monitoring 
(PRIM/MARDIS) 
Index of private monitoring, composed on the 
basis of: (1) whether bank directors and officials 
are legally liable for the accuracy of information 
disclosed to the public; (2) whether banks must 
publish consolidated accounts; (3) whether 
banks must be audited by certified international 
auditors; (4) whether 100 percent of the largest 
10 banks are rated by international rating 
Agencies; (5) whether off-balance sheet items 
are disclosed to the public; (6) whether banks 
must disclose their risk management procedures 
to the public; (7) whether accrued, though 
unpaid interest/principal, enter the income 
statement while the loan is still non-performing; 
(8) whether subordinated debt is allowable as 
part of capital; and (9) whether there is no 
explicit deposit insurance system and no 
insurance was paid the last time a bank failed. 
On a scale of 0–12, higher values of this index 
indicate greater regulatory empowerment of the 
monitoring of banks by private investors. 
Barth et al. (2013a) 
Insolvency risk 
(ZSCORE) 
Indicator of bank soundness, calculated as the 
natural logarithm of 
ZSCORE = (ROA + E/A)/Q(ROA). 
Authors’ calculation 
using data from 
FintechConnect 
Credit risk (NPL) Ratio of non-performing loans over total loans 
as a proxy for credit risk. 
Authors’ calculation 
using data from 
FintechConnect 
Market base risk 
(SDVOL) 
The standard deviation of the weekly bank stock 
returns in each year. 
Authors’ calculation 
using data from 
Datastream 
Capital (CAPITAL) The ratio total equity as percentage of total 
assets. 
Authors’ calculation 
using data from 
FintechConnect 
Bank size (SIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets (in US dollars). Authors’ calculation 
using data from 
FintechConnect 
Ownership 
(OWNERSHIP) 
Dummy variable equal to one if bank is foreign 
owned (50% or more of their assets). 
Claessens and Van 
Horen (2014) 
CEO duality 
(CEODUAL) 
Dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if 
the roles of CEO and board Chair are combined 
and 0 if the CEO does not act as the Chairman 
of the board. 
Bloomberg; Boardex; 
Thomson Reuter Eikon 
Inflation rate (INFA) Inflation rate (annual percent change of average 
consumer price index). 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
GDP (LNGDP) Natural logarithm of GDP (constant 2010 US$). World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Legal origin (LEGAL) Dummy variable equal to one if country is civil 
law, zero if country is common law. 
La Porta et al. (1999) 
Rule of law 
(RULEOFLAW) 
Index of rule of law ranges from approximately 
-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance 
performance. It reflects perceptions of the extent 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
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to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence. 
Concentration 
(CONC) 
Banking sector concentration, calculated as the 
share of assets attributed to three largest banks 
from the total commercial banking assets in the 
country. 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
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Appendix B.  
Sample distribution. 
Counties No. of banks No. of observation 
ARGENTINA 1 4 
AUSTRALIA 6 60 
AUSTRIA 9 58 
BELGIUM 3 26 
BRAZIL 4 21 
CANADA 9 58 
CHILE 4 16 
CHINA 16 92 
COLOMBIA 4 11 
CYPRUS 1 5 
CZECH REPUBLIC 1 6 
DENMARK 5 42 
GEORGIA 1 2 
GERMANY 10 70 
GREECE 6 52 
HONG KONG, CHINA 4 35 
HUNGARY 1 6 
INDIA 11 56 
INDONESIA 7 33 
IRELAND 6 39 
ISRAEL 3 12 
ITALY 17 137 
JAMAICA 1 4 
JAPAN 84 415 
KOREA, REP. 6 23 
KUWAIT 3 12 
LEBANON 1 4 
MALAYSIA 8 36 
MEXICO 1 7 
MOROCCO 1 5 
NETHERLANDS 3 23 
NIGERIA 2 9 
NORWAY 1 9 
OMAN 1 5 
PANAMA 1 4 
PERU 2 5 
PHILIPPINES 4 17 
POLAND 9 52 
PORTUGAL 5 44 
RUSSIA 5 29 
SAUDI ARABIA 1 6 
SINGAPORE 3 24 
SLOVAKIA 1 2 
SOUTH AFRICA 6 32 
SPAIN 11 85 
SWEDEN 4 59 
SWITZERLAND 3 21 
THAILAND 6 24 
TURKEY 16 54 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 1 5 
UNITED KINGDOM 5 50 
UNITED STATES 169 829 
Total 493 2735 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics. 
Variable Observations Mean SD Var Min Max 
ZSCORE 2,735 3.9954 1.2292 1.6880 -2.9120 9.8426 
NPL 2,277 0.0316 0.0506 0.0026 0.0010 0.6237 
SDVOL 3,452 0.0438 0.0276 0.0008 0.0028 0.3590 
BSIZE 3,452 2.4927 0.3343 0.1118 1.3863 3.5264 
BINDPEN 3,452 0.5295 0.3140 0.0986 0.0000 1.0000 
BDIVERS 3,054 0.1176 0.1062 0.0113 0.0000 0.7692 
CEODUAL 3,452 0.3946 0.4888 0.2390 0.0000 1.0000 
SIZE 3,452 18.8725 7.7036 59.3455 5.9962 28.9681 
CAPITAL 3,452 0.0848 0.0383 0.0015 0.0003 0.4377 
OWNERHSIP 3,452 0.0423 0.2013 0.0405 0.0000 1.0000 
CAPR 3,452 6.7113 1.8397 3.3844 2.0000 10.0000 
SUPP 3,452 11.7781 2.0778 4.3174 5.3846 16.0000 
PRIM/MARDIS 3,452 9.4109 1.3660 1.8661 6.0000 11.0000 
CONC 3,452 48.8467 17.8751 319.5210 20.4800 100.0000 
RULEOFLAW 3,452 1.1771 0.7415 0.5498 -1.1815 2.0964 
LEGAL 3,452 0.4783 0.4996 0.2496 0.0000 1.0000 
LNGDP 3,452 28.7924 1.5607 2.4359 23.3089 30.4403 
INFA 3,452 8.1114 10.5606 111.5262 -4.2127 40.7146 
 
 
Table 2 
Correlation matrix. 
 
ZSCORE NPL SDVOL BSIZE  BINDPEN BDIVER CEODUAL 
ZSCORE 1.0000             
NPL -0.3417*** 1.0000      
SDVOL -0.4726*** 0.4100*** 1.0000     
BSIZE -0.1213*** 0.2005*** 0.1058*** 1.0000    
BINDPEN 0.0085 -0.1181*** -0.0556*** -0.0515** 1.0000   
BDIVER -0.0101 0.0772*** -0.0235 0.1934*** 0.3326*** 1.0000  
CEODUAL 0.0192 -0.0690*** -0.0050 0.0218 -0.0715*** -0.1147*** 1.0000 
 SIZE CAPITAL OWNERHSIP CAPR SUPP MARDIS CONC 
SIZE 1.0000       
CAPITAL -0.2823*** 1.0000      
OWNERHSIP 0.1331*** 0.0724*** 1.0000     
CAPR -0.2179*** 0.3509*** -0.0773*** 1.0000    
SUPP -0.3466*** 0.2813*** -0.1307*** 0.3257*** 1.0000   
PRIM -0.5085*** 0.3575*** -0.1846*** 0.3950*** 0.3986*** 1.0000  
CONC 0.4817*** -0.4217*** 0.1257*** -0.3304*** -0.5010*** -0.6065*** 1.0000 
 RULEOFLAW LEGAL LNGDP INFA    
RULEOFLAW 1.0000       
LEGAL -0.3312*** 1.0000      
LNGDP 0.3233*** -0.4117*** 1.0000     
INFA 0.2865*** -0.5188*** 0.4597*** 1.0000    
Note: This table reports the pairwise correlation coefficients of key variables. *, **, *** denote the correlation coefficients with 
the significance level at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3 
Bank risk taking, board of directors and regulations. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables ZSCORE ZSCORE ZSCORE NPL NPL NPL SDVOL SDVOL SDVOL 
Lag dependent variable 0.5130** 0.4080*** 0.7456** 0.9703*** 0.8563*** 1.0394*** 0.4810*** 0.6179*** 0.4544*** 
 (0.2599) (0.1485) (0.3105) (0.0912) (0.1941) (0.1145) (0.1623) (0.1050) (0.1718) 
BSIZE -3.5845* -1.1025 1.0578 0.0045 0.0379** 0.0052 -0.0087 0.0065 -0.0117 
 (2.1005) (0.8522) (2.0934) (0.0198) (0.0176) (0.0099) (0.0247) (0.0218) (0.0256) 
BINDPEN -2.1488 1.6656 -0.5541 0.0361 -0.0266 0.0448 0.0471** 0.0361*** 0.0452*** 
 (2.1521) (1.0914) (1.6804) (0.0347) (0.0265) (0.0292) (0.0202) (0.0136) (0.0167) 
CAPR -0.4674 0.1356 0.1490 -0.0019 -0.0035 -0.0018 -0.0004 0.0018 0.0004 
 (0.4918) (0.1458) (0.2528) (0.0029) (0.0076) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0048) (0.0020) 
SUPP 0.2214 -0.1175 -0.0586 0.0009 0.0058** 0.0020 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.3069) (0.2342) (0.1291) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0014) 
PRIM 0.5461* -0.1419 0.0376 -0.0055 -0.0055 0.0012 -0.0036 -0.0020 -0.0042 
 (0.3196) (0.3341) (0.3364) (0.0067) (0.0153) (0.0054) (0.0078) (0.0102) (0.0077) 
CEODUAL -1.3336 -0.0090 -0.3099 0.0017 -0.0069 -0.0009 0.0092 0.0138 0.0042 
 (1.8278) (0.4884) (0.6163) (0.0152) (0.0252) (0.0065) (0.0123) (0.0088) (0.0097) 
SIZE 0.1993** 0.0275 0.0114 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0005 0.0010 0.0003 0.0014* 
 (0.0983) (0.0430) (0.0520) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009) 
CATPIAL 9.9250 -5.0325 -6.7454 -0.0364 -0.2185 -0.2645 -0.0895 -0.0473 -0.0070 
 (20.2652) (7.6913) (12.0389) (0.2985) (0.3290) (0.2045) (0.1925) (0.1542) (0.1491) 
OWNERSHIP 4.9824** -2.0442 1.5454 -0.0031 -0.0946 -0.0096 0.0302 0.0029 0.0402 
 (2.2682) (1.4210) (2.0296) (0.0365) (0.1071) (0.0149) (0.0318) (0.0340) (0.0593) 
INFA 0.0223 0.0032 0.0182 -0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 
 (0.0326) (0.0054) (0.0132) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
LNGDP 0.7837 -0.6603*** -0.2344 -0.0016 0.0091 0.0001 0.0016 0.0003 0.0050 
 (0.6554) (0.2203) (0.7182) (0.0060) (0.0075) (0.0040) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0040) 
LEGAL -0.9858 0.7653 0.2100 0.0069 -0.0103 0.0097 0.0085 0.0073 0.0064 
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 (0.7728) (0.5898) (0.8007) (0.0084) (0.0177) (0.0100) (0.0080) (0.0075) (0.0108) 
RULEOFLAW -0.2798 0.7408** 0.7580 -0.0028 -0.0172 -0.0058 -0.0039 -0.0027 -0.0010 
 (0.6478) (0.3567) (0.7948) (0.0057) (0.0121) (0.0055) (0.0064) (0.0085) (0.0046) 
CONC 0.0126 -0.0770** -0.0557 -0.0003 0.0012* -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 
 (0.0462) (0.0320) (0.0769) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
BDIVERS   -0.2640   -0.0215   -0.0476 
   (3.8792)   (0.0407)   (0.0342) 
BINDPEN_CAPR 1.0553   -0.0006   0.0005   
 (1.2329)   (0.0136)   (0.0078)   
BINDPEN_SUPP -1.4619**   -0.0012   0.0111**   
 (0.5721)   (0.0166)   (0.0045)   
BINDPEN_PRIM -3.5673*   0.0075   0.0001   
 (2.1246)   (0.0215)   (0.0142)   
BSIZE_CAPR  0.5675*   -0.0161   -0.0034  
  (0.3119)   (0.0151)   (0.0107)  
BSIZE _SUPP  -0.0748   0.0146*   0.0008  
  (0.3739)   (0.0080)   (0.0036)  
BSIZE_PRIM  -1.1467**   0.0362   0.0023  
  (0.5053)   (0.0253)   (0.0110)  
BDIVERS_CAPR   0.0318   -0.0020   0.0023 
   (0.4940)   (0.0050)   (0.0082) 
BDIVERS_SUPP   0.0287   0.0042   0.0140** 
   (1.0956)   (0.0050)   (0.0060) 
BDIVERS_PRIM   -1.9744*   0.0045   -0.0105 
   (1.0593)   (0.0091)   (0.0126) 
Observations 2,107 2,107 1,996 1,641 1,641 1,543 2,808 2,808 2,725 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Banks 460 460 441 377 377 359 456 456 451 
No. of instruments 46.0000 46.0000 48.0000 46.0000 46.0000 48.0000 46.0000 46.0000 48.0000 
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AR(2) p-value 0.3896 0.4075 0.8876 0.4969 0.5729 0.3058 0.6994 0.5412 0.6222 
Hansen p-value 0.7942 0.3827 0.2171 0.3123 0.9957 0.5256 0.6211 0.5004 0.8991 
Note: For all explanatory variables (except year effects and the inflation rate) lags are used as GMM-style instruments. Year dummies and fist lag of the inflation rate are 
used as IV-style instruments. The p-value of the Hansen J-statistic is the over-identification test for the validity of the instruments. The AR(2) test is the p-value of the test for 
second -order autocorrelation in first differences. The collapse option of xtabond2 has been chosen. Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered by country. We undertake ‘centering’ of the interaction term of board independence, board size, board diversity and regulatory variables by 
subtracting the mean from each observation due to highly collinear interaction terms. We add an additional row for board diversity (see columns 3, 6 and 9) due to the smaller 
sample used as a result of data constraints (fewer observations for board diversity, see Table 1), though estimations are based on maximum available data.*, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Re-estimations by board size. 
 Large Board Small Board Large Board Small Board Large Board Small Board 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables ZSCORE ZSCORE NPL NPL SDVOL SDVOL 
Lag dependent variable 0.3910*** 0.5161 1.0904*** 0.9049*** 0.6891*** 0.3873 
 (0.1219) (0.3167) (0.1607) (0.1748) (0.2318) (0.2591) 
BINDPEN 0.9915 -0.3458 0.0268* 0.0034 -0.0278 -0.0091 
 (0.7045) (2.5286) (0.0150) (0.0301) (0.0444) (0.0335) 
BDIVERS 1.7878 1.7021 -0.0338 -0.0054 0.0539 0.0051 
 (1.8053) (5.8895) (0.0344) (0.0593) (0.0941) (0.0806) 
CAPR 0.2875*** 0.0495 -0.0009 0.0005 0.0080 0.0005 
 (0.0851) (0.3050) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0069) (0.0047) 
SUPP -0.2966*** -0.0450 0.0021* 0.0034 -0.0010 0.0017 
 (0.0857) (0.2368) (0.0012) (0.0039) (0.0083) (0.0044) 
PRIM -0.3161* -0.1946 -0.0044 -0.0015 -0.0107* 0.0038 
 (0.1883) (0.6198) (0.0037) (0.0075) (0.0059) (0.0119) 
CEODUAL -0.1058 -1.1497 -0.0006 -0.0085 0.0118 0.0031 
 (0.3624) (1.0028) (0.0054) (0.0241) (0.0300) (0.0210) 
SIZE -0.0726 0.0414 0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0006 0.0023 
 (0.0650) (0.0512) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0027) 
CATPIAL 5.4366 -4.2926 -0.0763 -0.2131 -0.6583 0.2199 
 (17.4873) (18.2500) (0.2081) (0.4390) (0.4591) (0.1717) 
OWNERSHIP -2.0162 -2.3939 -0.0108 0.0073 0.1340 0.0497 
 (2.9505) (3.5663) (0.0113) (0.0802) (0.1174) (0.1292) 
INFA 0.0182 0.0106 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0010* -0.0001 
 (0.0161) (0.0174) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0001) 
LNGDP -0.2231 -0.4412 0.0000 -0.0035 -0.0063 0.0036 
 (0.2784) (0.4124) (0.0028) (0.0057) (0.0111) (0.0032) 
LEGAL 0.7895 0.2766 0.0005 0.0014 -0.0187 0.0005 
 (0.5021) (0.8764) (0.0087) (0.0155) (0.0191) (0.0177) 
RULEOFLAW 0.4789** 1.0042 -0.0017 -0.0034 0.0065 0.0030 
 (0.2029) (0.7796) (0.0038) (0.0108) (0.0183) (0.0177) 
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CONC -0.0345 -0.0781 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0014 0.0001 
 (0.0360) (0.0722) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0009) 
Observations 1,006 1,002 1,203 1,119 1,051 1,330 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of banks 234 309 204 234 244 335 
No. of instruments 40.0000 39.0000 40.0000 39.0000 40.0000 39.0000 
AR(2) p-value 0.9517 0.3478 0.2048 0.1261 0.1614 0.4454 
Hansen p-value 0.9293 0.3338 0.7829 0.6520 0.8476 0.2332 
Note: For all explanatory variables (except year effects and the inflation rate) lags are used as GMM-style instruments. Year dummies and fist lag of the inflation rate are used as IV-style 
instruments. The p-value of the Hansen J-statistic is the over-identification test for the validity of the instruments. The AR(2) test is the p-value of the test for second-order autocorrelation in 
first differences. The collapse option of xtabond2 has been chosen. Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by country.*, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Re-estimations by bank board independence. 
 High Independence Low Independence High Independence Low Independence  High Independence Low Independence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables ZSCORE ZSCORE NPL NPL SDVOL SDVOL 
Lag dependent variable 0.9725** 0.5096** 0.8596*** 0.8901*** 0.6581 0.5619** 
 (0.4284) (0.2154) (0.1196) (0.2322) (0.4373) (0.2582) 
BSIZE -1.4483 -1.9743 0.0266 0.0936** 0.0162 -0.0114 
, (1.5426) (1.5989) (0.0269) (0.0400) (0.0266) (0.0252) 
BDIVERS -1.3316 -0.9239 -0.0816 -0.0631 0.1107 -0.0682 
 (5.3601) (3.4157) (0.0627) (0.0550) (0.0694) (0.0666) 
CAPR -0.0945 -0.0754 0.0006 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0039* 
 (0.2859) (0.1699) (0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0021) (0.0023) 
SUPP -0.0599 0.0025 0.0039* 0.0030 0.0049** 0.0041 
 (0.1847) (0.1888) (0.0021) (0.0064) (0.0021) (0.0025) 
PRIM 0.4794 0.5558 0.0053 0.0115 0.0065 0.0111 
 (0.5479) (0.5196) (0.0074) (0.0131) (0.0078) (0.0076) 
CEODUAL -0.8708 0.3862 -0.0114 0.0176 0.0033 0.0079 
 (1.1570) (0.9809) (0.0110) (0.0173) (0.0217) (0.0110) 
SIZE 0.0538 0.0998 0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0009 0.0012 
 (0.0816) (0.1058) (0.0007) (0.0030) (0.0008) (0.0014) 
CATPIAL 14.7998 -7.8375 0.0690 -0.6517** 0.0756 -0.2214 
 (21.5091) (12.9784) (0.3485) (0.3040) (0.1606) (0.3336) 
OWNERSHIP 3.3962 1.8794 0.0483 -0.1245*** 0.2310* -0.0368 
 (4.8606) (1.4656) (0.0434) (0.0449) (0.1214) (0.0322) 
INFA -0.0243 -0.0235 -0.0000 0.0010 -0.0001 0.0013* 
 (0.0285) (0.0436) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0008) 
LNGDP -0.0356 0.0338 0.0004 -0.0213** -0.0082 -0.0013 
 (0.7074) (0.2679) (0.0109) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0046) 
LEGAL 0.4791 0.1523 0.0096 0.0191 -0.0023 0.0039 
 (0.8342) (0.4532) (0.0122) (0.0180) (0.0129) (0.0081) 
RULEOFLAW 0.8451 -0.2588 0.0035 -0.0139 0.0174 -0.0163** 
 (0.8898) (0.4159) (0.0141) (0.0116) (0.0135) (0.0067) 
CONC -0.0007 0.0045 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0011 
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 (0.0516) (0.0403) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007) 
Observations 1,027 969 796 747 1,404 1,321 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of banks 255 244 208 206 265 262 
No. of instruments 38.0000 40.0000 38.0000 40.0000 38.0000 40.0000 
AR(2) p-value 0.4009 0.5302 0.2193 0.2376 0.8026 0.7730 
Hansen p-value 0.3863 0.5856 0.1226 0.9055 0.1057 0.5804 
Note: For all explanatory variables (except year effects and the inflation rate) lags are used as GMM-style instruments. Year dummies and fist lag of the inflation rate are used as IV-style 
instruments. The p-value of the Hansen J-statistic is the over-identification test for the validity of the instruments. The AR(2) test is the p-value of the test for second-order autocorrelation in 
first differences. The collapse option of xtabond2 has been chosen. Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by bank due to multicollinearity. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Bank risk taking, board of directors and regulations (excluding less than 5 banks). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent Variable ZSCORE ZSCORE ZSCORE NPL NPL NPL SDVOL SDVOL SDVOL 
BSIZE -0.3590** -0.4300*** -0.4211*** 0.0083 0.0086* 0.0088 0.0060** 0.0062* 0.0058*** 
 (0.1345) (0.1118) (0.1324) (0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0056) (0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0020) 
BINDPEN -0.1380** -0.1398** -0.1372** 0.0060*** 0.0051*** 0.0061*** 0.0023** 0.0017* 0.0024* 
 (0.0554) (0.0616) (0.0551) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011) 
CAPR -0.0103 0.0119 0.0040 0.0015 0.0007 0.0016 0.0020 0.0016 0.0019 
 (0.0663) (0.0514) (0.0461) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0019) 
SUPP 0.0155 -0.0990 -0.0725 0.0000 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0015 
 (0.0736) (0.0644) (0.0575) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0018) 
PRIM -0.0199 -0.0486 -0.0246 -0.0073** -0.0074* -0.0071* -0.0044 -0.0049 -0.0045* 
 (0.1041) (0.0801) (0.0785) (0.0034) (0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0026) 
CEODUAL -0.2583 0.0737 0.0315 -0.0106* -0.0104 -0.0121 0.0024 0.0030 0.0030 
 (0.4763) (0.3272) (0.2996) (0.0059) (0.0069) (0.0074) (0.0043) (0.0034) (0.0043) 
SIZE -0.0146** -0.0109*** -0.0099** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0016*** 0.0003** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CATPIAL 7.0491*** 7.1162*** 7.2854*** -0.0556 -0.0522 -0.0507 -0.0851*** -0.0855*** -0.0858*** 
 (1.4713) (1.5151) (1.4461) (0.0609) (0.0587) (0.0564) (0.0249) (0.0247) (0.0253) 
OWNERSHIP 0.2404 0.2731 0.2973 -0.0215** -0.0192* -0.0218* -0.0087*** -0.0053 -0.0087*** 
 (0.1839) (0.2375) (0.2333) (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.0105) (0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0030) 
INFA 0.0164*** 0.0185*** 0.0186*** -0.0005** -0.0005*** -0.0005** -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003* 
 (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
LNGDP 2.7194* 2.4769 2.4662 -0.2414*** -0.2344*** -0.2402*** -0.0816 -0.0749 -0.0824 
 (1.3285) (1.6314) (1.4845) (0.0589) (0.0647) (0.0589) (0.0552) (0.0599) (0.0552) 
LEGAL 0.7207 2.1033 1.7393 -0.2368*** -0.2337*** -0.2337*** -0.0160 -0.0148 -0.0187 
 (1.2080) (1.4193) (1.3625) (0.0461) (0.0497) (0.0441) (0.0672) (0.0731) (0.0668) 
RULEOFLAW 0.9530 1.6371* 1.5871* -0.1083*** -0.1127*** -0.1074*** -0.0081 -0.0064 -0.0087 
 (0.8478) (0.7978) (0.7632) (0.0232) (0.0241) (0.0225) (0.0296) (0.0340) (0.0295) 
CONC -0.0005 0.0016 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0111) (0.0119) (0.0131) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
BDIVERS   0.2018   0.0184   -0.0116 
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  (0.8592)   (0.0244)   (0.0079) 
BINDPEN_CAPR 0.0658   -0.0071**   -0.0057   
 (0.1736)   (0.0029)   (0.0037)   
BINDPEN_SUPP -0.2281**   0.0076   0.0097***   
 (0.1090)   (0.0046)   (0.0034)   
BINDPEN_PRIM 0.0116   0.0001   0.0075*   
 (0.2268)   (0.0040)   (0.0043)   
BSIZE_CAPR  0.0855   -0.0010   0.0007  
 
 (0.0808)   (0.0017)   (0.0013)  
BSIZE _SUPP  -0.0405   0.0037*   0.0006  
 
 (0.0675)   (0.0018)   (0.0013)  
BSIZE_PRIM  -0.0255   0.0029   0.0019  
 
 (0.1130)   (0.0025)   (0.0023)  
BDIVERS_CAPR   0.2018   0.0184   -0.0116 
 
  (0.8592)   (0.0244)   (0.0079) 
BDIVERS_SUPP   -0.0119   0.0073**   -0.0057 
   (0.1484)   (0.0028)   (0.0037) 
BDIVERS_PRIM   -0.1856   0.0076   0.0098** 
   (0.1150)   (0.0047)   (0.0035) 
Observations 2,201 2,201 2,201 1,772 1,772 1,772 2,917 2,917 2,917 
Country/Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of banks 405 405 405 382 382 382 461 461 461 
R-squared 0.2984 0.2879 0.2909 0.6732 0.6706 0.6741 0.4412 0.4211 0.4423 
Note: Year and country dummy variables are included. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by country. We undertake ‘centering’ of the interaction term of 
board independence, board size, board diversity and regulatory variables by subtracting the mean from each observation due to highly collinear interaction terms.*, *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Bank risk taking, board of directors and regulations (non-US banks). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent Variable ZSCORE ZSCORE ZSCORE NPL NPL NPL SDVOL SDVOL SDVOL 
BSIZE -0.3220* -0.1286 -0.3337* 0.0106 0.0070 0.0117 0.0054 0.0002 0.0053 
 (0.1708) (0.1724) (0.1717) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0076) (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0032) 
BINDPEN -0.0919 -0.0889 -0.0922 0.0057* 0.0051* 0.0060** 0.0018 0.0014 0.0018 
 (0.0686) (0.0730) (0.0699) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0019) 
CAPR 0.0069 0.0183 0.0037 0.0027 0.0018 0.0027 0.0030 0.0027 0.0030 
 (0.0489) (0.0495) (0.0516) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
SUPP -0.0447 -0.0423 -0.0383 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0030 -0.0034* -0.0030 
 (0.0546) (0.0577) (0.0536) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
PRIM 0.1284** 0.1339* 0.1344** -0.0027 -0.0021 -0.0025 0.0005 0.0008 0.0004 
 (0.0474) (0.0664) (0.0516) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
CEODUAL 0.0215 -0.0656 0.0894 -0.0104 -0.0110 -0.0131 0.0026 0.0043 0.0029 
 (0.5100) (0.4018) (0.4896) (0.0098) (0.0081) (0.0119) (0.0044) (0.0030) (0.0046) 
SIZE -0.0116 -0.0103 -0.0105 0.0021** 0.0021** 0.0020** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
CATPIAL 10.0117*** 9.8970*** 9.8134*** -0.0883 -0.0814 -0.0716 -0.0426 -0.0466 -0.0434 
 (2.3445) (2.2275) (2.2933) (0.1223) (0.1244) (0.1136) (0.0441) (0.0426) (0.0456) 
OWNERSHIP 0.2806 0.2547 0.2901 -0.0207** -0.0193* -0.0215** -0.0080** -0.0063 -0.0079** 
 (0.2364) (0.2440) (0.2250) (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0102) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0035) 
INFA 0.0155 0.0166 0.0159 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0006* 
 (0.0197) (0.0182) (0.0192) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
LNGDP 2.4044* 2.2874* 2.3431* -0.2471*** -0.2406*** -0.2444*** -0.0928* -0.0892* -0.0934* 
 (1.1882) (1.1701) (1.2104) (0.0456) (0.0484) (0.0459) (0.0459) (0.0463) (0.0461) 
LEGAL 3.1998** 3.4326** 2.9290** -0.2793*** -0.2747*** -0.2725*** -0.0689 -0.0656 -0.0714 
 (1.2251) (1.2450) (1.2030) (0.0383) (0.0390) (0.0356) (0.0572) (0.0571) (0.0578) 
RULEOFLAW 2.4948*** 2.5533*** 2.3972*** -0.1323*** -0.1361*** -0.1299*** -0.0367 -0.0380 -0.0374 
 (0.7092) (0.7625) (0.6810) (0.0226) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0245) (0.0258) (0.0245) 
CONC (0.0124) (0.0118) (0.0125) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 (0.0173) (0.0271) (0.0457) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0007) 
BDIVERS   -1.0629**   0.0335   -0.0078 
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   (0.4644)   (0.0325)   (0.0119) 
BINDPEN_CAPR -0.0478   -0.0047   -0.0034   
 (0.1473)   (0.0033)   (0.0028)   
BINDPEN_SUPP -0.0735   0.0042   0.0043**   
 (0.1283)   (0.0048)   (0.0018)   
BINDPEN_PRIM 0.2244  0.0035  -0.0022 
 
 
 (0.2334)  (0.0042)  (0.0036)  
 
BSIZE_CAPR  0.0449   -0.0005   0.0014  
 
 (0.0565)   (0.0021)   (0.0011)  
BSIZE _SUPP  -0.1077   0.0048**   0.0028**  
 
 (0.0643)   (0.0017)   (0.0012)  
BSIZE_PRIM  -0.2305*   0.0029   0.0045*  
 
 (0.1245)   (0.0036)   (0.0024)  
BDIVERS_CAPR 
 
 -0.0329   -0.0053   -0.0034 
  
 (0.1456)   (0.0032)   (0.0027) 
BDIVERS_SUPP 
 
 -0.0779   0.0043   0.0043** 
  
 (0.1248)   (0.0048)   (0.0018) 
BDIVERS_PRIM   0.2199   0.0034   -0.0021 
   (0.2278)   (0.0041)   (0.0036) 
Observations 1,372 1,372 1,372 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,696 1,696 1,696 
Country/Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of banks 236 236 236 220 220 220 229 229 229 
R-squared 0.3734 0.3764 0.3772 0.6732 0.6741 0.6753 0.4822 0.4836 0.4827 
Note: Year and country dummy variables are included. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by country. We undertake ‘centering’ of the interaction term of 
board independence, board size, board diversity and regulatory variables by subtracting the mean from each observation due to highly collinear interaction terms.*, *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. 
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